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Statement by the Bulgarian Construction Chamber on the draft Public-Private Partnership Act

Statement by the Bulgarian Construction Chamber on the draft Public-Private Partnership Act

OPINION of the Bulgarian Chamber of Construction on the draft Public-Private Partnership Act, published for public consultation in accordance with Article 26 of the Law on Legislative Acts. DEAR MINISTER, The Bulgarian Chamber of Construction supports the adoption of a separate Act on…

STATEMENT

by the Bulgarian Chamber of Construction

on the draft Public-Private Partnership Act, published for public consultation in accordance with Article 26 of the Legislative Acts Act

DEAR MINISTER,

The Bulgarian Chamber of Construction supports the adoption of a standalone Public-Private Partnership Act. Following the repeal of the 2017 Act, the country was left without a horizontal framework, and this is one of the reasons why Bulgaria is implementing projects worth €880 million for the period 2019–2023, compared with €2.31 billion for Greece over the same period. Our position on the need for such a law is one of principle and consistency.

However, we state clearly: in the version proposed for public consultation, the draft bill will not lead to the implementation of projects. It has been drafted from the perspective of controlling public expenditure, rather than from the perspective of how a project can be made feasible and fundable. Around a third of the text deals with approvals, sanctions and restrictions, whilst private initiative is effectively eliminated with a single sentence; compensation in the event of termination is capped at the amount of the debt, and out-of-court dispute resolution is prohibited entirely.

Furthermore, there are no clear distinctions as to in which cases the Concessions Act will apply, in which the Public Procurement Act, and in which the Public-Private Partnership Act. The draft introduces its own procedure for selecting a private partner, its own administrative apparatus (an Interdepartmental Council and a Specialised Unit) and defines its scope of application through the transfer of operational risk, given that it is precisely operational risk that constitutes the distinguishing feature of a concession under European Union law (Article 5 of Directive 2014/23/EU) and under Article 31 of the Concessions Act. This effectively removes a contract, which is in essence a concession, from the concession regime. The creation of a third legal regime is an objective fact, ascertainable from the text, and is not a matter of legal interpretation.

What is awarded ‘in accordance with the Concessions Act’ and what is awarded ‘in accordance with the Public-Private Partnership Act’ is not determined on the basis of an objective criterion, but by a reasoned decision of an Interministerial Council comprising eleven ministers. The objective classification

of a concession or a public contract under European Union law, however, does not depend on a national administrative decision. The incorporation of a decision taken with absolute operational autonomy as the basis for defining the legal framework for awarding contracts under two different legal regimes (PPP or concession), administered by different state bodies, is a structural choice made by the legislator, not a coincidence. The Public-Private Partnership Act was repealed in 2017 (§ 3 of the transitional and final provisions of the Concessions Act) precisely to avoid a duplicative and contradictory national regime in relation to the comprehensive framework of Directive 2014/23/EU. The draft reintroduces a structure that the legislator had already deliberately abolished.

There is a lack of clear regulation regarding the overall process for establishing a public-private partnership, as the proposed bill contains only isolated provisions in this regard. There is also a lack of clarity regarding the nature of the public-private partnership agreement – is it an administrative contract within the meaning of the Code of Administrative Procedure, with all the legal and factual consequences arising therefrom, or is it a standard private-law contract to which general legislation (the Commercial Act, the Obligations and Contracts Act, etc.) would apply? The result is a framework that makes public-private partnerships legally possible but practically unenforceable.

Separately, and no less important for our sector: there is not a single provision in the entire draft bill concerning the contractor. There is no requirement for a building licence; the status of ‘contracting authority’ under the Spatial Planning Act is not defined; and there is no provision for an indexation mechanism in contracts with a term of up to 35 years. The Act treats PPPs solely as a financial transaction, rather than as a potential construction and operational process, or indeed a production process in general.

Below, we present our general comments, specific proposals regarding the text in tabular form, and our comments on the overall preliminary impact assessment.

I. GENERAL COMMENTS

1. Absence of a legal vacuum and existence of a market-management vacuum

There is no legal vacuum. At the level of contractual types, European Union law recognises only concessions (where operational risk is transferred) and public procurement (where it is not). By establishing operational risk as a defining feature (Article 4(2)(2)), the Act places the contract within the scope of concessions, whilst Article 1(4) simultaneously excludes the Concessions Act. As a separate legal category, the Act does not fill a gap.

However, a market and governance gap does exist, and it is very real. It lies not in the type of contract, but in the absence of a functioning, standardised and bankable ‘full life-cycle’ infrastructure market, in which construction is part of a comprehensive service rather than a one-off transaction at the lowest price. It is precisely here that the law has the potential to change the way in which Bulgaria carries out major infrastructure investments.

The actual gap has four dimensions:

A) A market for a comprehensive service covering the entire life cycle (design – construction – financing – maintenance). Today, the state awards construction contracts as separate deals, often at the lowest price, whilst maintenance is arranged separately and is usually unsatisfactory. Linking these elements in a single long-term contract with payment on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis shifts competition from the lowest construction price to the lowest cost over the asset’s entire lifetime and creates an incentive to ensure the construction is carried out to a high standard.

B) The transition of Bulgarian construction firms from the role of contractor (margin on construction works) to that of investor and operator with revenue throughout the entire life cycle; the municipal sector (schools, nurseries, sports halls, water and sewerage, waste disposal sites) is the natural niche for Bulgarian construction companies.

C) Project financing instruments not explicitly regulated by the current Concessions Act: direct agreements with creditors, subrogation and substitution, security under the Special Pledges Act, and refinancing with profit-sharing.

D) Market infrastructure: a national list (programme) containing specific projects that have been prepared or are to be prepared, standardised or predictable contracts, centralised expert capacity, and procurement based on life-cycle costs rather than the lowest price.

However, the draft bill does not secure the opportunities it aims to create. The legal framework (a third regime, defined by operational risk, outside the scope of the Public Procurement Act and the relevant directives) renders the procedures vulnerable to challenge and unfinanceable; Article 61(2) (compensation below the amount of the debt) and Article 74 (prohibiting even mediation) render the envisaged project financing instruments ineffective; and throughout the entire text there is not a single provision concerning the contractor – construction legal capacity, indexation, protection of subcontractors.

Thus, the law identifies the correct gap, but fills it with the wrong instrument.

This gap can be filled in two lawful ways, without a third regime that would conflict with EU law.

A) The first is a framework law based on the Polish model, which regulates preparation, evaluation, the contract, financing and supervision, but refers the actual award of the contract to the Concessions Act (in the case of operational risk) or to the Public Procurement Act (in the case of payment without operational risk).

B) The second is to refine the Concessions Act and the Public Finance Act so that they encompass the entire life-cycle framework.

Both approaches provide for a long-term market, without illegality, the risk of infringement proceedings or a lack of funding.

When considering the two possible legal approaches, it should be borne in mind that the framework model in Bulgaria will not be as ‘pure’ as in Poland. The Polish framework law is based on a narrow concession law that regulates only the award process, whilst the Bulgarian Concessions Act already contains the principles, institutions, preparatory phase, evaluation and contractual content.

Therefore, a framework law in Bulgaria would inevitably duplicate a significant part of the provisions of the Concessions Act, which would necessitate, on the one hand, specific but substantial amendments to the Concessions Act (the inclusion of missing institutions, such as subrogation, direct agreements, refinancing, as well as the order of priority in the event of a conflict), and, on the other hand, a significant expansion of the draft PPP Bill itself to incorporate this material. It is precisely this duplication that leads us to take the view that the cleaner legislative approach is to amend the Commercial Code directly, rather than creating a second Act that must be harmonised with the first.

In conclusion, the gap that this law has the potential to fill is economic and administrative, rather than legal.

In this regard, it should be noted that the Impact Assessment considers the option of amending the Concessions Act (Option 3), but defines it in a biased manner solely as a ‘mechanical addition’ of requirements and ‘regulatory overload’. Nowhere is there any discussion of a specific bill to amend and supplement the Concessions Act, regulating the transfer of rights, availability payments and institutional PPPs. The assessment therefore fails to refute the actual alternative. Furthermore, the claim that this option ‘regulates only the selection of the contractor’ is factually incorrect: the Concessions Act regulates the entire life cycle of the concession, not merely the award procedure. We therefore consider the conclusion regarding a ‘recommended option’ to be unfounded.

2. The relationship with European Union law has not been resolved.

Article 4(2)(2) requires the private partner to assume the operational risk. This is precisely the defining feature of a concession under Directive 2014/23/EU. The absence of this element renders the contract one for the performance of a public procurement contract under Directive 2014/24/EU. There is no legal scope for a third national regime between the two, and Article 1(4) of the draft law under consideration excludes both. The assertion in the explanatory memorandum that the draft law does not regulate matters covered by European law is inaccurate. Without resolving this issue, any procedure is open to challenge and no international lender will finance a project under this law.

In support of the above, Article 5 of Directive 2014/23/EU defines a concession as involving the transfer of operational risk, encompassing demand risk or supply risk, or both. The concessionaire is deemed to bear operational risk where, under normal operating conditions, there is no guarantee that it will recoup the investments made or the costs incurred in operating the works or services covered by the concession, and the risk transferred must involve genuine exposure to market fluctuations.

At the same time, Article 2(1)(5) of Directive 2014/24/EU defines a public works contract as a contract having as its subject-matter the execution, or the simultaneous design and execution, of works, the execution of a building or the realisation of a building in any manner in accordance with the requirements of the contracting authority. It is precisely this distinction that was confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-206/08 WAZV Gotha (Eurawasser): the national designation of the contract does not determine the applicable regime; what is decisive is whether there is an actual transfer of operational risk.

Furthermore, in Case C-324/98 Telaustria, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that, even in the case of contracts falling outside the specific scope of the Directives, contracting authorities are bound by the fundamental principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, including transparency, equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination. The Commission’s Green Paper COM(2004) 327 final explicitly treats PPPs as an economic and organisational form rather than as a separate legal category under European Union law, and therefore the applicable regime depends on the specific structure of the contract – a concession, a public procurement contract, a mixed contract or an institutional PPP.

It should be noted that the European Commission is currently preparing a new regulation to unify the legal framework for public procurement and concessions and to derogate from the existing directives on public procurement and concessions. As regulations are directly applicable, this is a further argument that calls into question the effectiveness of the draft bill proposed by the sponsors.

3. The substance of the law is set out in a subordinate act.

The types of procedures, the process for selecting a private partner, the tender documentation, the methodology for the comparative model, the audit and the grounds for amending the term are to be regulated by regulations to be adopted six months after the Act comes into force. The National Assembly will pass a law without knowing how contracts with terms of up to 35 years will be awarded, and the first applications will be submitted in a legal vacuum.

Such an approach not only renders the actions of the executive branch unlawful, insofar as the key regulatory provisions are transferred to a subordinate legislative act – which in practice means that a regulatory framework will be established by a subordinate legislative act—a framework that can only be the subject of a legislative act having the force of law—but it also creates conditions conducive to corrupt practices.

4. The Act is not bankable.

Article 61(2) excludes from compensation any liabilities to financing institutions which the public partner has not assumed. Article 74 even prohibits mediation. There are no payment deadlines or interest on arrears, no functioning indexation, and no exit from the investment under Article 51. Any one of these provisions, taken in isolation, is sufficient to prevent the financial closure of a project.

According to Eurostat’s Guide to the Statistical Treatment of PPPs (2016), for a project to be recorded off the government’s balance sheet, the majority of the risks and benefits must be borne by the private partner. In the Green Paper COM(2004) 327 final, the Commission links off-balance-sheet treatment to the private partner assuming the construction risk and at least one of the availability or demand risks. Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 on the European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA 2010) emphasises the actual transfer of economic ownership rather than the formal designation of the contract.

The complete prohibition on mediation under Article 74 has no equivalent in the European regulatory framework for PPPs. European Union law does not prohibit the use of arbitration or mediation in PPP contracts, provided that the effectiveness of European Union law and the mandatory legal remedies in public procurement are not affected. Such a national prohibition constitutes an excessive restriction which directly impairs the bankability of projects.

5. The time limits are undefined and, in some instances, technically incompatible.

The 45-day deadline set by the Minister of Finance forms part of the 60-day period within which the Unit must submit the draft, obtain an opinion and table it for approval. There is no deadline at all for the Council’s decision or for the approval under Article 26(1), even though the project has already been approved by eleven ministers. The stated aim of shortening the preparation time is unachievable under this text.

6. The construction sector is absent from the Act.

There is no requirement for construction and installation works to be carried out by persons entered in the Central Professional Register of Builders; there are no provisions governing the award of contracts under the Spatial Development Act, building permits or the commissioning of buildings; there is no mandatory indexation; there is no protection for subcontractors, who in our sector are predominantly small and medium-sized enterprises. If this is not rectified, the role of the private partner will be taken over by financial intermediaries, and the construction risk will be passed down the chain at a fixed price.

Article 71 of Directive 2014/24/EU regulates transparency and the protection of subcontractors, including the possibility of mechanisms for direct payments to them. Article 4 of Directive 2011/7/EU provides that, as a general rule, payments by a public authority should be made within 30 calendar days, which is directly relevant to the payment chain in construction PPP projects.

Article 68 of Directive 2014/24/EU expressly permits the use of life-cycle costs when determining the most economically advantageous tender. This is particularly important in construction PPP projects, where maintenance, repair and operational costs determine the actual value for the public partner.

II. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS REGARDING THE DRAFT TEXT

The proposals are listed in order of priority, not according to the numbering of the articles. Proposal No. 1 is a prerequisite for all the others.

LINK TO THE PROPOSALS: HERE

III. PROPOSALS FOR TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS AND RELATED AMENDMENTS

The draft bill does not contain a single accompanying amendment to the relevant laws. Without these, it is unenforceable, particularly at local authority level. We propose that amendments be included, either as separate bills to amend and supplement (in the case of the Public Finance Act) or within the transitional and final provisions, to:

  1. The Public Finance Act and the Municipal Budgets Act – provisions for entering into multi-year commitments under PPP contracts and availability payments. Without this, local authorities cannot legally enter into commitments for 20 or 30 years, and the entire availability payment model remains inapplicable to them. We recognise the special significance of the Public Finance Act within the Bulgarian legal framework and the fact that it can only be amended by means of a separate bill; we therefore believe that the debate on the adoption of the draft amendments to the Public Finance Act must run in parallel with that on the present bill.
  2. The State Property Act and the Municipal Property Act – the transfer of property for the purposes of public-private partnerships (PPPs) without a tender and its contribution as a non-monetary contribution to a PPP enterprise under Article 47. At present, Articles 47 and 48 have no basis in these Acts.
  3. The Spatial Planning Act – who is the contracting authority within the meaning of Article 161, the procedure for issuing a building permit, acceptance and commissioning, as well as the registration of rights over the project upon termination of the contract and its return to the public partner.
  4. The Chamber of Builders Act – compliance with the requirement for construction authorisation when performing PPP contracts.
  5. The Concessions Act and the Public Procurement Act – procedures for the acceptance and examination of files forwarded under Article 24(2), including the preservation of preparatory work and analyses carried out.

The accompanying amendments to the relevant laws are also necessary to ensure compliance with European Union law, in particular Directive 2014/23/EU and Directive 2014/24/EU, which require a clear and enforceable legal framework for the award of concessions and public contracts and prevent the circumvention of these frameworks.

IV. COMMENTS ON THE OVERALL PRELIMINARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

The assessment does not meet the requirements of the Ordinance on the scope and methodology for carrying out impact assessments and should be revised in the following respects:

  1. Costs. Table 6 shows zero in all rows, including for administration, despite the establishment of an Inter-ministerial Council, a secretariat to the Council of Ministers and a specialised unit involving fourteen institutions. The drafters of the bill claim that the implementation of the law does not require additional budgetary resources, whilst the assessment sets a target for building administrative and expert capacity within a one-year timeframe. These two claims cannot both be true.
  2. Negative impacts. The summary states that negative impacts ‘have not been identified’. For a piece of legislation that establishes a new licensing regime, a new collective body and administrative and criminal liability, this is not a credible conclusion.
  3. Targets. The explanatory memorandum sets a target of ‘at least five projects’ for 2026–2030, whilst the assessment puts the figure at 10–15 projects. The baseline is referred to at times as ‘two for the period 2019–2023’ and at other times as ‘0–1 project per year’. The targets and the baseline should be harmonised, as the ex-post evaluation will be based on them.
  4. SME test. The text contains an internal contradiction: it states that there is a ‘need to conduct targeted consultations, as no measures’ with a specific impact are envisaged. At the same time, it is claimed that there is no impact on SMEs and that the law expands their opportunities for participation as contractors and subcontractors. The assessment should be carried out in substance, taking into account the subcontracting chain in the construction sector.
  5. Compliance with European Union law. The assessment fails to take into account the obligations regarding compliance with and the correct application of European Union law, including the transposition and implementation of the directives on concessions and public procurement, and does not analyse the risks of non-compliance, procedural appeals and financial consequences. This analysis is necessary insofar as the draft bill purports to establish a horizontal framework for the entire life cycle of PPPs.

V. CONCLUSION

The Bulgarian Chamber of Construction supports the legitimate aim of the draft bill to establish a functioning, bankable and predictable regime for the implementation of infrastructure projects throughout their entire life cycle. This objective can be achieved in two lawful ways, without creating a third regime that conflicts with European Union law: through a genuine framework law based on the Polish model, which refers the award of contracts to the Concessions Act (where operational risk is transferred) or to the Public Procurement Act (where payment is made without operational risk), or by refining (amending and supplementing) the Concessions Act and the Public Finance Act.

The draft, in its current form, does not fulfil either of these conditions and cannot be adopted without substantial revision reflecting the proposals set out in Sections II and III. Proposal No. 1, concerning alignment with Directives 2014/23/EU and 2014/24/EU, is a prerequisite for the acceptability of the entire act; without it, the other improvements are of no practical significance. The comments received during the public consultation, including those published via the Public Consultation Portal, confirm the BCC’s main criticisms regarding the scope of the Act, the allocation of risks, the safeguarding of funding and the lack of sufficient regulation of the construction process. This demonstrates that the issues raised are not a matter of private interest to a single sector, but a systemic problem with the draft legislation.

We declare our readiness to participate in a working group on the revision of the draft bill and the drafting of the implementing regulations. We are making available the comparative analysis of European models prepared by the Chamber, as well as the working translation of the Polish Public-Private Partnership Act, which addresses the key issue of the relationship with European Union law in the manner described.

We request that a representative of the Bulgarian Chamber of Construction be included in the working group, as well as in the Specialised Unit referred to in Article 8(1).

YOURS FAITHFULLY,

ENG. LYUBOMIR KACHAMAKOV

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAMBER OF CONSTRUCTION IN BULGARIA



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